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It is known that the current economic re-
cession of the Western triad (USA, EU and Japan) 
started last August with the bankruptcy of some 
important banks in the real estate field of the 
American economy. Then, this dysfunction shat-
tered not only the real estate field of the American 
economy, but also the whole banking and stock 
market system of the triad, a system that seemed 
indestructible. As a consequence, the US economy, 
the economies of the countries in the Euro mone-
tary area and the Japanese economy simultane-
ously entered a state of recession in the second 
half of last year. Inevitably, this shock wave spread 
quickly, causing an important deterioration of the 
economic situation at global level. 
There has been talked and written a lot 
about these events in national and international 
media. Apparently, until now there were enough 
opinions, data and information present in the media regarding the nature, 
causes and consequences of the current dysfunctions in the most 
industrialized countries of the world, as well as in the economies of other coun-
tries. But in fact, a lot of these data and pieces of information have a very low 
degree of validity. In national and international media, there are, unfortunately, 
too many mystifications and ideological omissions regarding the so-called 
„global financial crisis” and few rational-cognitive evaluations of the nature, 
causes and consequences of the general recession within the Western triad. 
It is known that the evaluation of the nature, causes and conse-
quences of economic phenomena necessarily includes, when possible, the 
usage of some formal analysis patterns. In general terms, the microeconomic 
and macroeconomic capitalist systems can be considered structural-functional 
systems, in which the following critical activities and functions can easily be 
identified: 
  marketing activities; 
  research and development activities; 
  production or operational activities; 
  staff activities; 
  financial activities. 1 
Obviously, these sets of functions are made up of interdependent and 
not independent activities. Starting from this fact, if financial dysfunctions ap-
pear within a certain corporation, these are determined by endogenous causes 
(the low reliability of the financial subsystem) as well as, especially, by exoge-
nous causes (the low efficiency of marketing, research and development, pro-
duction and staff activities). In other words, the financial feasibility of corpora-
tions represents an effect, rather than a cause of efficient or inefficient usage 
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of the production factors (work and capital). In this context, if the financial dys-
functions of the systems are determined by endogenous causes, these dys-
functions are easier to be mended, manifesting themselves on short term in 
money stringencies. But if the financial dysfunctions at microeconomic and 
macroeconomic level are determined by the inefficient allocation of the pro-
duction factors, then their mending is much more difficult, in this case there is 
a solvency crisis. Therefore, the insolvency or the bankruptcy of economic sys-
tems actually involves long-term economic or multifunctional counter-perform-
ances, while financial crises usually involve short-term financial dysfunctions. 
Therefore the question to be asked is: what type of crisis are the economies of 
the most industrialized countries in the world confronted with? Money strin-
gency or solvency crisis?  
In general terms, the short- or long-term evaluation of the economic 
systems’ financial feasibility requires the identification, quantification and 
monitoring of the cash-flow. In a national or international company, for exam-
ple, with an operational field of activity, one can identify three essential cash-
flow categories: 
  cash-flows from financing; 
  cash-flows from investments; 
  cash-flows from exploitation or operational cash-flows. 
When the company is financing its actual investments from its own 
capital and from loan capital, it is financially feasible as long as the cash-flows 
from exploitation or operational cash-flows (the net operational profit and the 
amortization of fixed assets) are at least equal with the value of the debt ser-
vice (long-term credit reimbursements and credit interests) plus the value of 
the dividends paid to shareholders. In this case, the liquidity or solvency risk is 
negligible. But in an opposite case, the risk of, sooner or later, setting off a li-
quidity or solvency crisis becomes certain. 
In a similar way, the periodic evaluation of financial feasibility at 
macroeconomic level involves a systematic analysis of the cash-flows from fi-
nancing, from investments and from exploitation. From this point of view, na-
tional economies are financially feasible as long as the value of Gross Domes-
tic Product (GDP) minus the value of long-term Debt Service (DS) and of Net 
Exports (NE) is at least equal with the value of Final Consumption (FC) and of 
Investments (INV) minus the value of long term Loans (LOA), contracted by 
population, corporations or state in a certain year: 
PIB – SD - EN = CF + INV - IMP 
In this case, cash-flow surplus (the saving) represents a non-inflationist 
resource of consumption, investment and public debt financing. 
Analysing the long-term feasibility of the American economy in this 
way, one can find out that in the last three decades, the value of the GDP was 
systematically smaller than the final consumption and the long-term Debt Ser-
vice at national level. This is why the American economy was confronted with a 
chronic deficit of financial resources coming from saving. This deficit continu-
ally rose during the last three decades and was ultimately financed from inter-
nal resources (monetary issue) and external resources (actual or financial in-
vestments and bank deposits of non-residents). 
The financing, even the partial one, by the Federal Reserve (the FED) of 
consumption and investment credits, of the debts of the American govern-
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ment, was an inflationist one, because the FED constantly issued an immense 
quantity of currency, which was to be reimbursed over long periods of time. But 
as there has been and still is an acute need for dollars at global level, this FED 
policy did not generate inflation, as predicted, neither in the US, nor in other 
countries. Furthermore, the immense external financial inputs diminished the 
inflationist impact of the monetary policy imposed by the FED. This is why the 
American economy „overheated”, even though the gap between the growth of 
final consumption and debt service, on the one hand, and the growth of GDP, 
on the other, explosively multiplied, especially in the last few years. But the fact 
that the FED facilitated the access of population, companies and government 
to cheap financial resources determined a series of perverse effect, like the 
following: 
  the excessive growth of consumption credits to the detriment of 
research and development credits;  
  the gradual deterioration of American companies’ financial feasi-
bility, as a result of the decrease of their competitiveness in 
comparison to foreign companies;  
  the explosive increase of oil imports;  
  the endless postponement of implementing non-polluting 
technologies in the chemical and energetic industry;  
  the decrease of banks’ and audit companies’ exigency regarding 
the evaluation of financial feasibility of projects financed through 
bank credits;  
  the transformation of the Western triad from a net creditor into a 
net debtor of the emerging triad (Russia, China, India). 
 
The moment when the proportion of these negative effects caused by 
the over-indebtedness of the population and the American government 
reached a critical limit, and the oil price became prohibitive, the companies’ 
and the population’s insolvency could not be „rolled over” through the cheap 
dollar policy promoted by the FED and the tax reduction policy imposed by the 
Bush administration. Consequently, the American financial system became 
non-functional, and the real sector of the American economy went into reces-
sion, a fact that also determined the same consequences in the countries de-
pendent on the American real and financial markets. 
In conclusion, the current financial crisis, that affects the world, started 
in the USA and in the G7 countries, as a consequence of commercial, techno-
logical, productive inefficiency and insolvency of the real and financial sectors 
of these countries’ economies. The West didn’t import, but exported the 
current financial crisis. The consequence is that the crisis’ negative effects will 
be much more important in economically developed countries, than in emerg-
ing or economically underdeveloped countries. Finally, counterbalancing this 
crisis involves corrective and preventive costs, proportional to the nature and 
the intensity of the crisis. From this point of view, the ball is in the American 
court. The American economy’s insolvency and recession can not be settled or 
diminished any more, like in the past, through monetary injections and transfu-
sions. It is not possible to emerge out of recession as long as the main invalid 
of the current economic epidemic, the American economy, does not treat its 
disease. It is a disease with financial symptoms, but which is actually caused 
by the acute deterioration of productivity and of the production factors’ 
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profitability, simultaneous with the over-indebtedness and the insolvency of 
companies, population and government. A disease that involves a treatment as 
difficult to endure as the one given to a drug addict who is weaning off drugs… 
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